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a modest blow for simplicity and give the unpopular Notice 2000-
418 a decent burial.
FOOTNOTES
1
  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,
Pub. L. 108-27, Sec. 201(a), amending I.R.C. § 168(k)(4).
2
  Id., Sec. 202(a), amending I.R.C. § 179.
3
  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law Ch. 29 (2003); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 4.03[4][l] (2003).  See Harl,
“Additional Depreciation Allowance and Loss Carrybacks,” 13
Agric. L. Dig. 49 (2002); Harl, “Additional Guidance on the 30
Percent Depreciation Allowance,” 13 Agric. L. Dig.  73 (2002);
Harl, “When Are Assets ‘Used’?” 13 Agric. L. Dig. 177 (2002).
4
  T.D. 9091, 68 Fed. Reg. 52985 (Sept 8, 2003), adding Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.168(k)-1T.
5
  I.R.C. § 168(k)(4).
6
  I.R.C. § 168(k)(4)(B).
7
  Id.
8
  I.R.C. § 168(k)(2)(A)(ii).
9
  I.R.C. § 168(k)(1)(A).
10
  Notice 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 313.
11
  Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(k)-1T(a)(2)(iii).
12
  Id.
13
  Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-1(b)(3)(ii).
14
  Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(k)-1T(f)(1).
15
  See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(k)-1T(f)(2)(iii).
16
  2000-1 C.B. 313.
17
  Id.
18
  Id.
The prior regulations specify that no depreciation is allowable
for property placed in service and disposed of during the same
taxable year.13  The new temporary regulations contain a similar
provision.14  That provision bars a bonus depreciation claim on
a trade that occurs if the taxpayer acquires and disposes of an
asset in the same taxable year.  However, the new temporary
regulations allow a 50 percent bonus depreciation allowance
for property acquired and placed in service after May 5, 2003,
that had been acquired in a 2002 trade where the property
qualified for the 30 percent depreciation allowance.15
Example:  Farmer M purchased a new combine in 2002 for
$200,000, claiming a 30 percent bonus depreciation allowance
of $60,000 and regular depreciation of $15,000 (assuming a
seven-year life, 150 percent declining balance and a half-year
convention).  That reduced the combine’s income tax basis to
$125,000 as of January 1, 2003.  On June 1, 2003, Farmer M
traded the combine for a new combine, paying boot of $50,000.
The adjusted income tax basis of the new combine is $175,000
(the $125,000 basis on January 1, 2003, plus boot of $50,000).
For the June 1, 2003, purchase, Farmer M can claim a 50 percent
bonus depreciation allowance of $87,500 (50 percent of
$175,000) plus regular depreciation for the year.
Harmonization of regulations with Notice 2000-4
An obvious problem framed by the new temporary regulations
is whether it is possible to harmonize the basis calculation rules
with Notice 2000-4.16  The 2000 Notice specifies that the income
tax basis of property relinquished in a like-kind exchange, such
as a machinery trade, is to remain on the depreciation schedule
as a separate item.  Only the boot paid is treated as newly
purchased MACRS property.17 At a minimum, it seems
inconsistent to allow a 50 percent bonus depreciation allowance
on the carryover basis plus the boot paid and then to require
that the carryover basis amount remain as a separate line on the
depreciation schedule.  It would seem more appropriate to strike
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BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS.
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. Prior to filing for Chapter 7, the
debtors operated a cattle farm and cattle hauling business. The
cattle and trucks were sold in the bankruptcy case and the debtors
obtained off-farm employment. The debtors claimed exemptions
for various farm implements and equipment as tools of the trade.
The debtors provided evidence of a lease of nearby farm land
and expressed an intent to restart cattle raising through cattle
share or leasing contracts, although no such contracts had yet
been obtained. The proposed cattle operation would incur
additional expenses which were not included on the bankruptcy
schedules. Most of the proposed cattle operation would be financed
by family loans and the off-farm income. The court noted that
much of the equipment was in poor condition and would require
repair before use. The FSA held a security interest in the equipment
and the debtors sought to avoid that security interest as impairing
the exemptions.  The court held that the debtors did not provide
sufficient evidence of a reasonable ability to resume farming in
that too many expenses were not accounted for and the sources of
revenue were too speculative. In re Henke, 294 B.R. 105 (Bankr.
D. N.D. 2003).
WAGES. The debtor was a dairy farmer who filed for Chapter
7. The debtor claimed exemptions under federal nonbankruptcy
and state exemption law. The debtor received two payments
postpetition, one for milk produced pre-petition and one as a
federal subsidy for lower milk prices. The debtor claimed both
payments as exempt under Vt. Stat. tit. 12, § 3170(b)(1) to the
extent of 75 percent of the payments. The court held that the
Vermont statute applied only to judgment debtors and
garnishment by a judgment creditor. In re Riendeau, 293 B.R.
832 (D. Vt. 2003).
FEDERAL TAX
PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan in a footnote provided
that interest and penalties on the allowed tax claim were to be
treated as general unsecured claims. The plan was confirmed
without objection and the debtors sought a ruling that the interest
and penalties were discharged. Except for the possible res
judicata effect of the plan, the interest and penalties were not
dischargeable. The court held that the plan provision would not
be given preclusive effect because it was not in accordance with
bankruptcy law and was not given extraordinary notice in the
plan sufficient to place the IRS on notice that a provision was
included which violated general bankruptcy law. In re Luarks,
2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,646 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiffs had
entered into hedge-to-arrive contracts with the defendant grain
elevator. The plaintiffs were farmers who decided to roll over
their HTA contracts several times until the defendant elevators
were forced to seek margin payments from the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs sued for breach of contract by the elevators and breach
of fiduciary duty by the agents who sold the contracts. The
plaintiffs alleged that the futures commission merchant was
ultimately responsible for the misrepresentations of the selling
agents and elevator as the principal for the selling agents and
elevator. The appellate court upheld a jury verdict against the
elevator on the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty,
awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The court held
that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the expertise and knowledge of
the cooperative’s employees as to the HTAs gave rise to a
fiduciary duty and that punitive damages were allowable where
a jury could find that the breach was accompanied by fraudulent
or tortious activity. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence of a control relationship between the futures
commission agent and the sellers of the HTAs to raise a jury
question as to whether the sellers were acting as agents of the
futures commission agent and make the futures commission
agent liable for the breach of contract damages. Finally, the
court reversed a summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ claims
of violations of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) by the
futures commission merchant. The court held that, because the
merchant also sold futures contracts to the plaintiffs as part of
the HTA schemes, the actions of the merchant were covered by
the CEA. Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.,
No. 02-2373 (8th Cir. 2003).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BEGINNING FARMER PROGRAMS. The FSA has
announced the availability of funding to implement the
Beginning Farmer and Rancher Land Contract Guarantee Pilot
Program as required by Section 310F of the Consolidated Farm
and Rural Development Act. This section directs the Secretary
to establish a pilot program to provide guarantees of loans made
by private sellers of a farm or ranch on a contract land sale basis
to qualified beginning farmers or ranchers.  The announcement
describes the eligibility and application requirements for the pilot
program and the criteria that the Farm Service Agency (FSA)
will consider in evaluating requests for guarantees under the
program. The notice also describes actions that FSA will take if
a buyer fails to pay on the contract. 68 Fed. Reg. 52557 (Sept.
4, 2003).
FARM LOANS. The plaintiff was married to a farmer who
obtained loans from the FSA. The plaintiff signed the loan
agreements but did not participate in the farm operation or
payment of the loans. The loans were secured by farm property
owned by the plaintiff and spouse as tenants by the entireties.
The spouse defaulted on the loans and filed for bankruptcy in
which the spouse’s share of the loans was reduced to the fair
market value of the property. The plaintiff did not participate in
the bankruptcy.  Eight years later, the FSA decided that the
plaintiff’s share of the loans was not altered by the bankruptcy
and sought payment from the plaintiff and foreclosure against
the property. The plaintiff argued that the plaintiff should not be
liable for the loans because the plaintiff did not participate in the
farm, and the FSA should be estopped from seeking payment
from the plaintiff because the eight year delay and because the
FSA did not provide the same notice to the plaintiff as was
provided to the spouse. The court held that the plaintiff did not
sign the loan agreements as a mere accommodation because the
plaintiff received a benefit from signing in that the money was
used to retain the farm property. The court also held that the FSA
was a joint creditor and could proceed against one owner of a
property held as tenants by the entireties. The court held that the
FSA was not estopped from seeking payment from the plaintiff
and foreclosure because the doctrine of laches did not apply
against an agency of the United States and there was no
unreasonable delay. Baker v. Veneman, 256 F. Supp.2d 999
(E.D. Mo. 2003).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT.  The plaintiff was a producer/seller of tomatoes and sold
tomatoes under contract to the defendant. The defendant had
bribed USDA inspectors to improperly downgrade the quality
of the produce inspected for the defendant. The defendant
rejected several lots of tomatoes based on the false inspections
and the plaintiff agreed to a lower price for the shipments. The
inspectors and an employee of the defendant were arrested and
Agricultural Law Digest 139
VALUATION. The taxpayer and daughter formed a family
limited partnership funded with marketable securities and real
estate which belonged to the taxpayer. The taxpayer and daughter
received limited and general partnership interests in proportion
to the value of the assets contributed. The taxpayer initially gifted
a majority of the limited partnership interest to the daughter as
trustee of a trust for heirs and small interests to four
grandchildren. The taxpayer then gifted the remaining limited
partnership interest to the daughter personally. The taxpayer filed
a gift tax return but the IRS rejected the valuation of the gifts.
The parties agreed to value the partnership interests using the
net asset values but disagreed on the applicable discount for
lack of marketability and minority interest. The court held that
an 8.5 percent minority discount for the securities and a 19
percent  minority interest discount for the real estate would be
allowed, producing an overall 15 percent discount for the
minority partnership interests. The court also allowed a 24
percent discount for lack of marketability. Lappo v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2003-258.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CAPITAL EXPENSES. The taxpayers leased a store in a
shopping mall. The taxpayers had to make substantial
improvements in order to use the space for a bakery, including
ceilings, walls and floors; ventilation systems, utility systems,
safety and handicapped facilities; and general remodeling of the
space. The improvements, except bakery equipment were to
become the property of the landlord upon installation. The lease
abated the rent for the first six months. The taxpayers claimed
that the cost of the improvements was offset as rent payments.
However, the six months of rent totaled only $18,000 and the
remodeling expenses exceeded $127,000. The court held that
the remodeling expenses were capital expenses except to the
extent of the value of the six months of free rent. The taxpayers
were not allowed an expense method depreciation deduction
because no election was made on the original returns. McGrath
v. Comm’r, No. 03-60273 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2003), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 2002-231.
CORPORATIONS
WORTHLESS STOCK. The taxpayer had invested in a
corporation which eventually was terminated after losing several
lawsuits. The taxpayer argued that the taxpayer’s stock in the
corporation became worthless in 1989 when several court actions
in the cases indicated that the stock was worthless. However,
the court noted that the court actions in 1989 did not resolve all
of the lawsuits and that some value remained until 1993 when
the final lawsuit was resolved against the corporation. The court
held that the loss on the stock could not be claimed as a deduction
until 1993. In re Steffen, 294 B.R. 388 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
convicted of bribery but none of the cases involved the
inspections of the plaintiff’s shipments. The plaintiff filed a
reparations claim under PACA to recover the price adjustments
agreed to after the false inspections. The USDA and District
Court held that the price adjustment agreements were void under
the doctrine of mutual mistake because of the misrepresentations
of the defendant as to the integrity of the inspection process.
Koam Produce, Inc. v. DiMare Homestead, Inc., 329 F.3d
123 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’g, 213 F. Supp.2d 314 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).
WETLANDS. The plaintiff owned a farm and applied to
the county for a permit to allow development of the property as
tilled farmland. The federal definition of wetland is any property
consisting of hydric soils, wetland hydrology, and hydrophytic
vegetation. See 16 U.S.C. § 3801 (a)(18).  However, the county’s
land use ordinance defines wetland as any property containing
hydric soils, wetland hydrology, or hydrophytic vegetation. See
County of San Diego RPO Art. II, P 16. The plaintiffs argued
that the federal definition preempted the county definition of
wetland. The court held that the federal definition of wetlands
did not preempt the county ordinance because there was no
specific intent by Congress to preempt local law. The court noted
that the federal definition was part of a spending program as an
effort by Congress to limit eligibility for federal farm programs
and not a general prohibition of development of wetlands.
Citizens For Honesty and Integrity in Regional Planning v.
County of San Diego, 258 F. Supp.2d 1132 (S.D. Calif. 2003).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT  TAXATION
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The
decedent’s estate included an IRA, undistributed IRA funds for
the year of the decedent’s death, and proceeds from HH savings
bonds. All of these funds were to be distributed to three charities.
The IRS ruled that the IRA funds, except to the extent of any
nondeductible contributions, and the proceeds of the HH bonds
were income in respect of decedent and the estate was eligible
for a charitable deduction to the extent these funds were passed
to the charities. Ltr. Rul. 200336020, June 3, 2003.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
bequeathed so much of the estate property to an inter vivos trust
for the surviving spouse so as to reduce the estate tax to zero.
Before death, the decedent had transferred the residence to the
marital trust; however, the transfer failed to include a separate
parcel in the legal description of the property. The estate filed
Form 706 with an election on Schedule M for 100 percent of
the marital trust property to be QTIP. The second parcel was
discovered after the filing of the estate tax return. The estate
sought an extension of time to file a QTIP election for the second
parcel of property. The IRS ruled that an extension was not
necessary because the second parcel passed under the will to
the marital trust and the Schedule M election covered all of the
property which passed to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 200336014, May
30, 2003.
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Tele-Tax system toll-free at 1-800-829-4477 or on the IRS Web
site at www.irs.gov. IR-2003-106.
EMPLOYEE. The taxpayer was a lawyer who operated a
sole practitioner law practice. The taxpayer hired two persons
to provide secretarial and paralegal services for the office. The
court held that the persons were employees because (1) the
taxpayer had control over the work to be performed; (2) the
taxpayer provided the equipment and office to perform the
work; (3) the income from the work was fixed by the hourly
wage provided;  (4) the taxpayer had the right to fire the persons
at any time; (5) the persons performed services integral to the
taxpayer’s business; (6) the persons did not perform temporary
work; and (7) the taxpayer did not follow consistent procedures
in treating the persons as independent contractors in that the
taxpayer did not secure an employer identification number and
did not file Forms 1099-MISC.  In addition, the court noted
that the taxpayer attempted to conceal the true nature of the
relationship by not claiming a deduction on Schedule C for
secretarial services but merely subtracted the wages as
“negative income.” Kumpel v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-
265.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The IRS has issued a revenue
ruling that over-the-counter drugs can be paid for with pre-tax
dollars through health care flexible spending accounts (FSAs).
The guidance clarifies that employer reimbursements of
employee health expenses that are nonprescription drugs,
including reimbursements through health FSAs and Health
Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs), are excluded from
income like other employer reimbursements of employee health
expenses. Rev. Rul. 2003-102, I.R.B. 2003-38.
The taxpayer suffered a coronary artery spasm and was
declared permanently disabled under the taxpayer’s employee
disability plan. The plan defined a permanent disability as an
“inability or incapacity of an Employee to perform any
significant portion of the Employee’s duties for or on behalf
of the company...” I.R.C. § 105(c) provides that gross income
does not include amounts that (1) constitute payment for the
permanent loss or loss of use of a member or function of the
body, or the permanent disfigurement of the taxpayer, and (2)
are computed with reference to the nature of the injury without
regard to the period the employee is absent from work. In a
Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled that, because the
plan defined disability in terms of a condition that renders the
participant incapable of satisfactorily performing the duties
with the employer and not in terms of the loss of a body member
or loss of a function of the body, Section 105(c) was not
satisfied and any payments under the plan were included in
the taxpayer’s taxable income.  The IRS cited Watts v. U.S.,
703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983) (disability payments for
hypertension taxable); Hines v.Comm’r, 72 T.C. 715 (1981)
(disability payments for damaged heart taxable); King v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1996-52 (same). The IRS also ruled that
the plan payments did not meet the Section 105(c) requirements
because the payments were not adjusted for the severity of the
injury. CCA Ltr. Rul. 20036033, June 6, 2003.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS.  The taxpayer
had been employed as a loan officer in a bank but was forced
to leave when the taxpayer refused to divulge confidential
information about clients. The taxpayer sued the bank for
intentional interference with contract and economic
expectations for wrongful discharge from employment. The
parties eventually reached a settlement which included punitive
damages and payment directly to the taxpayer’s attorneys. The
taxpayer argued that the compensatory damages, the portion
of the settlement paid to the attorneys and the punitive damages
were excludible from income. The Tax Court acknowledged
that the taxpayer’s lawsuit was based on tort but held that the
settlement proceeds and punitive damages were included in
income because the tort was not based on personal injuries.
Although acknowledging a split of authority on the issue, the
Tax Court also held that the settlement proceeds paid directly
to the taxpayer’s attorney were included in income. The
appellate court affirmed on the issue of the settlement proceeds
paid to the taxpayer but reversed on the issue of the taxability
of the attorney fee portion of the settlement, holding that, under
Oregon law, the attorney’s had sufficient property rights in
the fees to remove them from the taxpayer’s taxable income.
Banaitis v. Comm’r, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,638
(9th Cir. 2003), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo.
2002-5.
DISASTER LOSSES. On August 23, 2003, the President
determined that certain areas in Pennsylvania were eligible
for assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of severe storms,
tornadoes and flooding that began on July 21, 2003.  FEMA-
1485-DR. On August 23, 2003, the President determined that
certain areas in New York were eligible for assistance under
the Act as a result of a state wide power outage that began on
August 14, 2003. FEMA-3186-EM.  Accordingly, taxpayers
who sustained losses attributable to the disaster may deduct
the losses on their 2002 federal income tax returns.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer agreed
to purchase property from a seller. The taxpayer borrowed
money from a third party creditor for portion of the purchase
price and the seller took a promissory note for the remaining
portion. The seller agreed to not enforce payments on the
seller’s note until the loan from the third party was paid. The
taxpayer became delinquent on both loans and the seller
stopped requiring payments on the seller’s note. Under a
settlement, the seller forgave the seller’s note. The taxpayer
was insolvent at the time of the forgiveness of the note.  The
IRS ruled that the forgiveness of the seller’s note was a
purchase price adjustment and the discharge of income was
not included in taxable income. Ltr. Rul. 200336032, June
10, 2003.
EDUCATORS’ EXPENSES. The IRS has issued a
reminder to elementary and secondary school teachers of the
up to $250 deduction from adjusted gross income for classroom
supplies. The IRS noted that the deduction expires after 2003.
More information is available as Tax Topic 458 on the IRS
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HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed full-time as
a paralegal and operated a fish camp on a lake. The taxpayer
also  raised horses which were stabled and trained about 265
miles from the taxpayer’s residence. The court held that the
horse breeding activity was not operated with an intent to make
a profit because (1) the taxpayer did not keep records sufficient
to analyze the profitability of the activity or to make informed
business decisions; (2) although the taxpayer consulted some
experts, there was no evidence that the taxpayer made any use
of the advice to make the operation profitable; (3) the taxpayer
spent only spare time on the activity and had two other
employment activities; (4) the activity had a history of only
losses; (5) the taxpayer had no history of making a business
profitable, including the fish camp which also had only losses;
and (6) the taxpayer had income from other sources which was
offset by the horse breeding activity losses. Howard v. Comm’r,
T.C. Summary Op. 2003-124.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in September 2003,
the weighted average is 5.30 percent with the permissible range
of 4.77 to 5.84 percent (90 to 120 percent permissible range)
and 4.77 to 6.37 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range)
for purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2003-63, I.R.B. 2003-38.
RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDIT. The taxpayer was
formed to develop, own, and operate a wind energy conversion
facility on leased land. The taxpayer sold the wind generated
electricity to unrelated parties in the wholesale power market.
State law provided a refundable state income tax credit based
upon, among other things, the amount of real property taxes
and the increase in employment from the taxpayer’s business.
The taxpayer was not obligated to reinvest any proceeds
attributable to the state income tax credit in the wind energy
conversion facility or any other project for producing electricity
from renewable resources. The IRS ruled that the state income
tax credit did not reduce the federal income tax credit, under
I.R.C. § 45, for production of electricity from renewable
resources, because the state income tax credit was not based on
the capital cost of the construction or acquisition of the wind
generating facilities. Ltr. Rul. 200336023, June 5, 2003.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the publication on its
web site of Publication 943 (2003), Employer’s Annual Federal
Tax Return for Agricultural Employers. See www.irs.gov/
formspubs/index.html.  This publication can also be obtained
by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676).
The taxpayer was married during all of 1998 but did not file
an income tax return for 1998. In challenging an IRS assessment
for unpaid taxes, the taxpayer calculated taxes using the
“married, filing jointly” status. The court held that the taxpayer
was entitled to use only the “married, filing separately” status
because no return was filed. Arnold v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2003-259.
S CORPORATION
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer claimed a pass-
through loss from an S corporation and presented evidence from
bank statements and personal testimony to support alleged
contributions to the corporation that created an income tax basis
in the taxpayer’s stock. The court held that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the taxpayer’s basis because the taxpayer
failed to demonstrate that the funds came from the taxpayer.
Arnold v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-259.
SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE. The IRS has
adopted as final regulations relating to the income, employment
and gift taxation of split-dollar life insurance arrangements.
The regulations generally define a split-dollar life insurance
arrangement as any arrangement (that is not part of a group
term life insurance plan described in I.R.C. § 79) between an
owner of a life insurance contract and a non-owner of the
contract under which either party to the arrangement pays all
or part of the premiums, and one of the parties paying the
premiums is entitled to recover (either conditionally or
unconditionally) all or any portion of those premiums and such
recovery is to be made from, or is secured by, the proceeds of
the contract. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(b). A special rule applies
in the case of an arrangement entered into in connection with
the performance of services. Under this special rule, a split-
dollar life insurance arrangement is any arrangement (whether
or not described in the general rule) between an owner and a
non-owner of a life insurance contract under which the
employer or service recipient pays, directly or indirectly, all
or any portion of the premiums and the beneficiary of all or
any portion of the death benefit is designated by the employee
or service provider or is any person whom the employee or
service provider would reasonably be expected to name as
beneficiary. (Like the general rule, this special rule does not
apply to any arrangement covered by I.R.C. § 79.) This special
rule also applies to arrangements between a corporation and
another person in that person’s capacity as a shareholder in the
corporation under which the corporation pays, directly or
indirectly, all or any portion of the premiums and the
beneficiary of all or a portion of the death benefit is a person
designated by, or would be reasonably expected to be
designated by, the shareholder. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1.
A split-dollar life insurance arrangement (as defined in the
regulations) is taxed under either the economic benefit regime
or the loan regime. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(d). Under the
economic benefit regime, the owner of the life insurance
contract is treated as providing economic benefits to the non-
owner of the contract. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22. Under the loan
regime, the non-owner of the life insurance contract is treated
as loaning premium payments to the owner of the contract.
Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15. The economic benefit regime must
apply (and the loan regime may not apply) to any split-dollar
life insurance arrangement if (i) the arrangement is entered
into in connection with the performance of services, and the
employee or service provider is not the owner of the life
insurance contract, or (ii) the arrangement is entered into
between a donor and a donee (for example, a life insurance
trust) and the donee is not the owner of the life insurance
contract. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(d).
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The regulations provide rules for determining the owner and
the non-owner of the life insurance contract. The owner is the
person named as the policy owner. If two or more persons are
designated as the policy owners, the first-named person generally
is treated as the owner of the entire contract. However, if two or
more persons are named as the policy owners and each such
person has an undivided interest in every right and benefit of
the contract, those persons are treated as owners of separate
contracts.  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(b). 68 Fed. Reg. _____
(September _, 2003).
In conjunction with the final regulations discussed above, the
IRS has obsoleted Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, Rev. Rul.
78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67, and Rev. Rul. 79-50, 1979-1 C.B. 139.
Additionally, Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12, has been obso-
leted except as provided in Section III, Paragraph 3, of Notice
2002-8, 2002-1 C.B. 398, and Notice 2002-59, I.R.B. 2002-36,
481. In the case of split-dollar life insurance arrangements en-
tered into on or before September 17, 2003, taxpayers may con-
tinue to rely on the above revenue rulings to the extent described
in Notice 2002-8, but only if the arrangement is not materially
modified after that date. Rev. Rul. 2003-105, I.R.B. 2003-__.
TAX LIENS. In United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal tax lien that arises
under I.R.C. § 6321 “all property and rights to property” of a
delinquent taxpayer attaches to the rights of the taxpayer in
property held as a tenancy by the entirety (entireties property),
even though local Michigan law insulates entireties property
from the claims of creditors of only one spouse. The IRS has
issued guidance of general principles it will use in situations
involving tenancy by the entireties interests in property. (1)
Under I.R.C. § 6321, the federal tax lien attaches to all the
property and rights to property of the taxpayer. (2) As a matter
of administrative policy, the IRS will, under certain
circumstances, not apply Craft, with respect to certain interests
created before Craft, to the detriment of third parties who may
have reasonably relied on the belief that state law prevents the
attachment of the federal tax lien. (3) The administrative sale of
entireties property subject to the federal tax lien presents practical
problems that limit the usefulness of the IRS’s seizure and sale
procedures. Levying on cash and cash equivalents held as
entireties property is considerably less problematic and will be
used by the Service in appropriate cases. (4) Because of the
potential adverse consequences to the non-liable spouse of the
taxpayer, the use of lien foreclosure for entireties property subject
to the federal tax lien will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
(5) As a general rule, the value of the taxpayer’s interest in
entireties property will be deemed to be one-half. (6) Where
there has been a sale or other transfer of entireties property
subject to the federal tax lien that does not provide for the
discharge of the lien, whether the transfer is to the non-liable
spouse or a third party, the lien thereafter encumbers a one-half
interest in the property held by the transferee. Notice 2003-60,
I.R.B. 2003-__.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
ANIMAL FEED. The plaintiffs were award-winning dairy
farmers who hired an employee of a cooperative to provide advice
about feed for their dairy cows. A major reason for hiring the
employee was because the employee had access to the technical
support provided by the defendant. The employee used the
defendant’s employees, information, advice, and computer
software to prepare rations for the plaintiff’s cows. The rations
included ground corn from the defendant which the plaintiffs
claimed caused rumenal acidosis in the cows because the corn
was too finely ground and fermented too quickly in the cows’
rumen. Several cows died and many became sick after eating
the rations and milk production decreased dramatically. The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove any agency
relationship between the employee and the defendant to give
rise to the defendant’s liability. The court held that sufficient
evidence of an agency relationship existed to support the jury
verdict of an agency relationship between the defendant and
employee. The court noted that the employee’s employer
cooperative was an associated cooperative with the defendant.
On the issue of negligence, the noted ruled that, under  Nebraska
law, the applicable standard of care for the employee’s ration
advice was whether a reasonable dairy feed specialist, with
specialized knowledge, skill, training and experience, would have
recommended using rations with the size of grain particles
actually fed to the plaintiffs’ dairy herd. The court held that the
plaintiffs had provided sufficient expert testimony that supported
the jury verdict of negligence by the employee in recommending
the dairy feed. The court reversed on the jury award for lost
profits, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient
evidence of the historical milk production to determine the lost
profit award. Racicky v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 328 F.3d
389 (8th Cir. 2003).
CITATION UPDATES
Brown v. United States, 329 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2003) (marital
deduction) see p. 76 supra.
In re Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 257 F.
Supp.2d 1274 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (checkoff) see p 55 supra.
The Mattie K. Carter Trust v. United States, 256 F. Supp.
2d 536 (N.D. Texas 2003) (passive activity losses) see p. 77
supra.
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
October 23, 2003: “Farm & Ranch Income Tax”  by Neil E. Harl
October 24, 2003: “Farm & Ranch Estate and Business Planning”
by Roger A. McEowen
Spa Resort, Palm Springs, CA
Registrants may attend one or both days.  The registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law
Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law (and for each registrant for multiple registrations from one firm)
are $185 for one day and $360 for both days. The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200 for one day and $390 for both days.
Registration brochures have been mailed to all subscribers. In addition, complete information and a registration form are
available now on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or
e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
*    *    *    *
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
“Farm Income Tax and Estate and Business Planning”
by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 5-9, 2004    Waikoloa Beach Marriott Resort, Big Island of Hawaii
Come join us at our “Seminar in Paradise” on the Big Island of Hawaii in January 2004.  The seminars are designed to provide a
morning of intense learning about the important issues of agricultural tax, estate planning and business planning and afternoons and
evenings are free to enjoy the soft island breezes, professional golf courses and the best deep sea fishing.
The seminars run from 8am to Noon each day. The Monday and Tuesday seminars will cover Farm Income Tax; the Wednesday and
Thursday seminars will cover Farm Estate Planning; and the Friday seminar will cover Farm Business Planning. The registration fees
are $645 for current subscribers and $695 for nonsubscribers.
All Digest subscribers should have received a brochure by now. If you missed your brochure, please contact us.
EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNTS. Up to October 1, 2003, early registrants will be able to pay a non-refundable (unless we
cancel) deposit of $100 in exchange for a $50 reduction of the registration fee. If you are interested and want more information, call
Robert at 541-302-1958 or e-mail at robert@agrilawpress.com.
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